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F 0 R R E L E A S E F R I D A Y A.M.'s ----
ADDRESS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA) 
at the 
1971 EISENHOWER SYMPOSIUM, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 
Thursday, November 18, 1971, 8:00 p.m. 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION : POWER IN TRANSITION 
I am delighted to find myself delivering the benediction 
at these proceedings . It is an uncommon experience. The last 
word is something that is rarely reserved for the Leadership in 
a Senate of unlimited debate, 
Notwithstanding this built- in propensity for talk, 
however, the Senate has a~ted with unusual dispatch during the 
paet few weeka . While this symposium has pondered the dilemmas 
0f power, the Senate has sought to resolve several of them. 
With regard to V~et Nam, for example, the Senate 
vcted first to establish a nation~l policy cf full withdrawal 
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within six months . Later, at the insistence of the House, which 
had an assist from the Administration, the specific time span 
was removed and full withdrawal was accepted only as a Congres-
sional rather than a national policy. Still later, in other 
legislation, and with the reluctant concurrence of the House 
and the Administration, the Senate's insistence on full with-
drawal from Viet Nam was established as national policy but 
still without a opecific withdrawal date. Finally, in a foreign 
aid bill, the Senate is making one more effort to restate its 
pristine a~d more emphatic position on Viet Nem, that is, f~ll 
withdrawal within six months~ 
In similar tugs and sta~ts and stops, the Senate voted 
to cut, then to increase parts of foreign a!.d; then to reject it 
in toto, only to resuscitate most of the Admir..istra.'tion:s aid 
program in two bills a short time later, un~erscoring the fact 
that foreign aid is a prcgram with more lives than a cat. 
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Contrary to the appearances, these actions are more 
than marches up the hill and do~m . They are not empty gestures. 
They say what the people of thenation are saying . In language 
which is audible in the other Branches they say that the Senate 
wants the war in Viet Nam to end completely and soon. They say, 
too, that the Senate is growing insistent on a sweeping revision 
and scale- down of for eig,1 aid . 
The apparent indecisiveness of the actions arises, 
in part, from the fact that there are other centers of federal 
power- -in the House and in the Presidency- - wherein other ideas 
are held and with which the Senate must come to terms. It is 
also a reflection of a kind of dil~mma of power: it is sympto-
matic of the uncertainty of the Congress in confronting the 
salient factor of the contemporary international situation. 
I am sure this symposium has long since identified 
that factor. It is the rurge of change which is sweeping the 
globe. From the rin:l~'"lds of Asia to the western littoral of 
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Europe international relationships of a generation are giving 
way; just as currencies , fixed in value for decades, are now 
floating, so too are old alliances and alignments. 
In this nation, a new outlook is readily detectable. 
It is present especially in the young who are not bound by the 
fixations of the past but it is by no means confined to the 
young. The international experiences of the past few years 
have shocked the thought patterns of the entire nation. 
In the United States, the time for a change in foreign 
policy is ripe. If this situation finds a counterpart in the 
Soviet Union, then we may well be on the threshhold of the 
liquidation of the dubious heritage of the cold war . Ironically, 
the era of cold war is ending not in the "positions of strength," 
which at one time were regarded in u. s. policy as an essential 
of peace; indeed, the Secretary of Defense has even raised 
doubts about the present capacity of our defenses. Nor is the 
cold war clostng Jn drastiC' changes in the state systems of 
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Eastern Europe, or the West , which, once in the eyes of more 
militant ideologists in both countries, were held to be the 
only basis for its ending . 
Rather, the heat has been taken out of the cold war, 
if I may mix the temperatur es, by degrees . Old conflicts have 
dissolved slowly in symposia such as the one which is taking 
place here, to which I allude as symbolic of the growth of 
peace~~l interchange between the two systems. 
The old conflicts are also diluted b7 the emergence 
of other international ~onsiderations which have pressed into 
the purview of the two nations . China, for example, no\v looms 
large in the concerns of the Soviet Union . At the same time, 
the United States is immersed in the practical and urgent u~reats 
to the economy, more or less to the exclusion of the theoretical 
and distant menaces of alien ideologies. 
Ironically~ this transition comes at a time when the 
affairs of the nation are presided over by a Republican 
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Administration which was once in the front ranks of what was 
termed the "battle for the minds of men . " May I say that the 
irony is all to the credit of the incumbent political leader-
ship . The President has been ahle to set aside the things of 
the past . In the light of present realities, he is acting to 
remove some of the bar nac l es which encrust the foreign policy 
of the United States . 
Without detracting from the Administration's achieve-
ment in any way, I think it is fair to note that the times have 
been over - ripe for this change . I like to think, too, that the 
level of reason is such in this nation that the transition mignt 
have come under any perceptive administration of whatever par~i-
san stripe . But , perhap~, that is an excessively sanguine 
expectation. In any event, there is little question of the 
general effectiveness of the incumbent Administratior... It is 
&n effectiveness which tends to support Walter Lippmann's thesis 
that liberal change is best brought about by conservative 
government . 
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The critical element in the Administr ation ' s new 
approach to international policies , it seems to me , is the 
Nixon Doctrine which was unveiled in Guam in 1969. That Doctrine 
set the stage for a diminution of the role which the United 
States has played across the spectrum of world affairs for 25 
years. In so doing, it elevated a concept of policy much arti-
culated but little practiced since World War II--that of shared 
responsibility for the maintenance of world peace . The changes 
which have been wrought by the Doctrine ar e already evident not 
only in Southeast Asia but elsewhere around the globe, as bases 
are closed and u. s. military forces abroad are reduced . 
In some quarters, there is a tendency to see in this 
process of military contraction some sor t of shameful furling 
of the flag . Rather, the change is sensible and long overdue . 
It acts to reduce the too heavy burdens which have been carried 
for too long by the people of the nation often in the vague 
name of ''international commitment. •• Moreover, if the flag has 
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been placed by a mistaken policy in places where it does not 
belong--as in Indochina--its withdrawal under the Nixon Doctrine 
is not only an essential act in our vital national interests, it 
is also the only honorable course. Indeed, if the Doctrine is 
to have historic significance in my judgment, it will bring about 
not a partial but a complete termination of u. s. military involve-
ment in Southeast Asia; that means everywhere on the mainland, 
be it in Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand and by land, sea 
and air. The Doctrine will also provide, if it is to have historic 
significance, the rationale for a continuing reduction in our 
one- sided military efforts elsewhere in the world, notably, in 
\~estern Europe under NATO. 
Notwithstanding the diminution of the U. s. military 
presence abroad, the Unit ~d States is not about to disappear 
from the international scene. This nation's weight is immense 
and it will continue to be felt in many ways and in many places . 
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That is as desirable as it is inevitable. Indeed, a sensitive 
concern with affairs beyond our borders remains an essential of 
the world's civilized survival. That such is the case argues 
strongly for a most judicious use of our resources abroad. There 
is no longer a surplus to be expended in haphazard, almost indis-
criminate fashion, for fear that the label of isolation may 
otherwise be pinned on our policies. 
It is reassuring, therefore, that along with the 
military contraction, the omnipresence of u. S . economic aid 
is also in the process of receding around the globe. In this 
scale-down which affects largely the bilateral programs of aid, 
the Senate has played and will continue to play an important 
part. It is to be anticipated that pressure from the Senate 
further 
will bring about/changes in the basic design of the program. 
The fact is that the present system has lost much of 
the charisma which was imparted to it by the Marshall Plan} the 
Point- Four program and the Peace Corps of another time. Foreign 
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aid has become, in recent years, a lavish grab- bag, an inter-
national pork barrel, and a world wide arms distribution . As 
presently constituted , the program is an economic drain on the 
nation. More seriously, it has led the United States via the 
path of a well- meaning humanitarian generosity into unwarranted 
political and military involvements in the i nner affairs of other 
peoples . 
It may be that foreign aid can be recast into its 
earlier form of people- to- people cooperation . As it involves 
economic development, the program has already moved in large 
part out of bilateral channels and into multilateral agencies . 
~at is a welcomed change . It has the virtue of permitting the 
burdens of cost to be shared with other nations . At the same 
time, it insulates this nation from adventures in ~~ilateral 
interr.ationalism which can lead, as we have seen in Indochina, 
into tragic en~anglements. 
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Underlying the new direction in U. S. policies, I 
believe, is a growing tendency to view this nation's interests 
less in the context of ideological generalities and more in 
terms of national well- being and survival. Viet Nam has alerted 
the people to the consequences of a blind pursuit of ideological 
obsessions. The dollar crisis and the dangerous sidetracking 
of the nation's inner needs by the demands of the involvement 
in Southeast Asia have revealed what lies at the end of the 
road of indiscriminate internationalism. Henceforth, it is 
to be expected that the United States will exercise greate~ 
discretion in choosing grounds on l-lhich to defend a more 
narrowly construed concept of this nation's responsibilities 
and interests in the world . 
It is essential that the implications of the nel>~ 
U. S. approach be considered most carefully by the other 
nation whose dilemmas of power are juxtaposed against our 
own in this symposium. indeed, the risks of confrontation 
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between the United States and the Soviet Union 
may even be increased temporarily by the pr esant contracting 
of the U. S. position . That would be the case if the contrac-
tion led to probings of the new limits of our interests abroad. 
If such probings were to occur , they could very well strike 
close to the vital considerations of civilized survival. 
The effect of a number of other shifts in the balances 
of world power must also be considered in this time of transition . 
The world is moving away from a bipartite determinism of inter-
national politics . Major questions of war and peace may no 
longer rest over\'lhelmingly in the province of the Soviet Union 
and the United States . Now China is emerging as a major power. 
So, too, at least in economic terms, is the European Community 
and Japan . 
With more major nations on the scene , more differencec 
to settle and perhaps , more sources of military and nuclear 
power to man:ipulat~J the problems of peace grow more complex . 
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We may find that the risk of conflict increases in proportion 
to the rising number of contenders and the broader the diffusion 
of international power . 
Hopefully, these unhappy possibilities will not come 
to pass . They need not if the dilution of the roles of the 
United States and the Soviet Union is accompanied by greater 
understanding and restraint between these two nations and timely 
adjustment of relationships with third nations. The United 
States and the Soviet Union are i n a unique position at this 
point in history. They are emerging from a protracted pe:r·iod 
of mutual antagonism, without having come to a direct military 
confrontation. There is little doubt that the combined strength 
of the two nations , in har mony, could assure to them a substan-
tial share in shaping the conditions of peace . By the same 
token, in disharmony: that strength can lead to the ultimate 
disaster of nuclear war or, at the least, it could condemn the 
possibilities of establishing a d~rable peace for decades to 
ccme. 
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I do not think that this new situation and the oppor·· 
tunities presented for negotiation have been lost on the Nixon 
Administration . The President , as you know, is pursuing a 
policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. He is proceed-
ing on the assumption that many of the differences between the 
two governments can now be accommodated and that the inter est 
of neither is served by continuing conflict . 
In this process , the highest priority should continue 
to rest on the negotiations with regard to disarmament . The 
SALT talks have been described by the President as ''the m0st 
important arms control negotiations this country has ever 
entered." Their success could provide an inestimable contri-
bution to international stability. By the same token, however , 
their failure could signal a resumpt ion of the nuclear arms 
race at a point of great risk . 
The initial indications reveal at least a mutual 
w1derstanding of viewpoints and a mutual eagerness to move 
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towards agreement . The Soviet concern is already delineated 
as seeking to forestall the u. S. deployment of defensive 
weapons, that is the anti- ballistics missiles , and to enlarge 
the talks to include u. S. nuclear weapons which are deployed 
at forward bases in Europe and elsewhere within relatively 
short-range of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the prime 
U. S. concern, it is clear, is the desire to limit Soviet 
offensive missiles and to maintain our alliances in Europe 
and the Far East . 
Each of the two governments have acknowledgedthe 
priorities of the other. At least that is a beginning, in 
which the cards have been placed on the table. The candor is 
refreshing and provides, in my judgment, some modest basis for 
hope to the arms- burdened people of both nations. In the months 
ahead the negotiators will be preoccupied with complex question~ 
involving the mathematics of limitation. In what way must the 
United States curb its deplo~nent of ARM's and by how much if 
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agreement is to be reached? At What point should there be a 
ceiling on offensive Soviet ICBM 1 s or on Soviet missile carry-
ing submarines in order to achieve an agreement? 
If the negotiator s find answers to questions of this 
kind and an agreement is reached, the Senate will be well pr e-
pared to act on its r esponsibilities with regard to r atification . 
Even now, the talks a r e being watched with special inter est in 
the Senate . Just a few weeks ago, I visited the U. S. Ambassad~r 
to the SALT talks who was at that time in Helsinki and, I must 
say, was reassured by his optimism. 
Beyond disarmament, it seems to me that the two most 
complex issues which will confront the Soviet Union and the 
United States during this period of transition involve the 
relationships with inner Europe, east and west, and with Chin~. 
With respect to China, it seems to me that the President has 
taken a highly significant initiative in his decision to go to 
Peking . The visit should not be expected to achieve much in 
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the way of substance . After a lapse of contact for almost a 
quarter of a century, however, the very act of going should 
open new prospects for building a stable peace in the Western 
Pacific. If these prospects are to Materialize, clearly they 
cannot be pursued by the United States in China oblivious to 
the concerns of the Soviet Union or Japan. It would be danger-
ous in the extreme if the path to Peking were to bypass either 
Moscow or Tokyo . 
In my judgment , a durable pattern of international 
stability in East Asia depends upon relations of comity a1nong 
all four principal powers. I am delighted, therefore, that by 
the Treaty of Okinawan Reversion, as well as in his brief meet-
ing in Alaska with the Emperor of Japan, the President has 
acted to protect-- so to speak- - one flank of his peregrination 
to the Chinese capital . At the same time, his announced visit 
to Moscow should safeguard the other, especially when it is 
coupled with the public assuranc es which he has given that a 
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rapprochement between China and the United States is in no ~ay 
designed to exacerbate Sino- Soviet difficulties . 
It may be that the round of personal contact by 
President Nixon will lead subsequently to more tangible results 
than meetings of this kind in the past. Who, now, for example, 
remembers Glassboro? And what was achieved there? 
A natural follow- through of the President's visits, 
it seems to me, might well be quadrapartite talks on the 
maintenance of peace--a peace of the Pacific . In considering 
this question tibere is a need for a franK confrontation of the 
four major nations-- Japan, the Soviet Union, China and the 
United States--whose power converges in the Western Pacific . 
There is also need for greater contact on this question betwec~ 
them and the smaller countries of the region . The clarity of 
direct contact can contribute, I believe, to trE stability of 
a situation in which the nuclear power of three nations already 
converges and where the techni~al capacity exists to add a 
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fourth input at any t~te . Indeed, it would seem that Japan, 
alone having chosen to eschew nuclear weapons, might well 
take the initiative in calling such a conference. A quadra-
partite conference might well be designed in the first instance 
to seek to bring nuclear dangers--whether in testing or in 
potential conflict-- under rational control in the Western 
Pacific . 
With regard to Europe, negotiations underway and 
agreements already achieved appear to be leading to a mere 
stable situation. That progress provides further ration~le 
for the reduction of the military deployments of both the 
Soviet Union and the United States . The circumstances are 
trere, I believe, for a new thrust for peace in Europe . The 
present Administration has shown a greater responsiveness to 
these circumsta~ces than has heretofore been the case . For 
its part, I believe the Soviet Union has given evidence of a 
new flexibility in responding aff1rffiatively to the "eastern 
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policies" of Chancellor Willy Brandt . I refer in particular 
to the non-aggression pact which the Soviet Union and West 
Germany have already initialed and a similar treaty with 
Poland wherein West Germany has explicitly accepted the Oder-
Neisse boundary. Finally, it should be noted that the Soviet 
Union has provided, in a four- power agreement, with France, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, official acknowledge-
ment of the present status of West Berlin and its ties to 
West Germany. 
In the light of these agreements as well as the 
hopeful e~anations from the SALT talks, there is a timely 
opportunity for negotiating mutual and balanced reductions 
of forces between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries . 
Such reductions might well be over and above what I have 
lon~ since believed can be a unjJatPral draw-down of 50% 
in U. S. force levels in Europe . May I say that I do not 
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regard the present level of u. S . forces in Europe in any 
sense as a 'bargaining chip"in negotiating a mutual reduction 
of forces with~ the Soviet Union . There is no bargaining 
power in the irrelevant; an excessive and antiquated U. s. 
deployment in Europe , and the enormous costs which it entails 
cannot strengthen the u. s. position in negotiations . It can 
only weaken further the international economic position of 
this nation. 
Whether the Soviet Union reciprocates or not, there-
fore, I believe the United States would be well- advised to 
make a substantial reduction of its military deployment in 
Western Europe . Indeed , a unilateral initiative in this 
connection may even act as a spur to mutual agreement. I 
do not think the Soviet Union will find it practicable to 
keep inflated forces in Eastern Europe when there are not 
inflated U. S. force levels in Western Europe . I am reminded 
again of Dwight D. Eisenho..,.1er 1 s conclusion that one diYisio!'l 
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of U. S. forces in Europe would suffice for the purposes cf 
the North Atlantic Treaty. That conclusion '"'as set for'\.h a 
dozen years ago by the first NATO Comma11der but has 
been studiously ignored by successive administrations ever 
since. 
Looking beyond prospective developments in arms 
control and the political and military st~bilization of Europe, 
it seems to me that a major objective of our relat..:..onship \-:i "';h 
the Soviet Union should be a substantial increase in economic 
interchange . This nation 1 s trade with the Soviet Union and 
the entire Eastern bloc has been held in check for many yea~:s 
~Y rusty barri~rs designed to prevent the shipment of so- caJ~ed 
strategic items to Communist countries. 
The present Administration has moved to facilitate 
·::.:r:e grmtth of traC:e in non- strategic goods with Eastern E>.1rc;e. 
ro;evertheless, the volume of U. S . tr~de \<l.lth the bloc countriee. 
remains slender by any measure . E1·en though this trade ross 
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now amounts to only seven- tenths of one percent of U. S. 
trade with all countries . 
Until the advent of the present Administration, the 
United States government had been most reluctant to spur 
commercial relationships with Eastern Europe. By contrast , 
the Western Europeans have pursued these tie~ with great vigor 
for a number of years . In 1969, their combined trade with 
Eastern Europe was 15 times that of the United States in 
dollar volume . 
The potential of East- West trade could be more fully 
realized by U. S. business if certain steps were to be taken 
at once . One would be the restoration of equal treatment to 
Soviet export commodities and a bill to accomplish this is 
now pending in Congress. Another would be to revise the list 
of strategic items to permit American bus1ncss to sell goods 
in Eastern Europe which are now freely offered there by other 
Nestern nations. Still another would be to broaden the 
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executive waiver power by which prohibitions can be lifted 
on financing sales to Eastern European nations through the 
Export-Import Bank. None of these things will necessarily 
result in a dramatic upsurge in trade but they might lead 
to increasing economic contacts. Over the long run, that 
could do much to strengthen the stability of the Soviet-
U. S. relationship . 
Following closely on the heels of trade) is the 
\olhole matter of cultural interchange which has so much to do 
with the perceptions that the two nations have of each other . 
Hopefully, if the people of the United States and the Soviet 
Union educate enough of each other's students , listen to 
enough of each other ' s musicians , watch each other 's athletes 
compete , hold a sufficient number of symposia and so on 
through a wide range of activities, they might come to an 
in~reased ,n.dP.rstandj ng and apprecj ati on 'fli th consequent 
reduction in the possibility of conflict . That is the pre~ise 
on .. 1hich ot...r cnlturg,l e::change pro ~:ra ,r; is based . It seems to 
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me to be a sound premise . Unfortunately, the presant progr am 
with the Soviet Union has fallen on hard times for a varlet:· of 
reasons, not the least of which have been acts of harassment by 
militant groups in this nation. 
The Soviet Union and the United States have come ~ 
long way from the days of the Berlin Blockade, the Hungarian 
uprising, the Cuban missile crisis , and the bombastic encounter s 
of the 1950's and early 1960's. We stand now at the threshhcld 
of a new era in which many of the suspicions and antagonisms of 
the past can be set aside. President Nixon has an opportunicy 
to consolidate this progress, indeed, this progress to which his 
Administ~ation has so gr eatly contributed. 
It is a moment of historic opportunity--not in ·cerrr·· 
of national gain or political profit--but in the opportunity 
which is offered to increase the probability of the decen~ sur-
vival of modern civilization. If there is any lasting conclusi0n 
to which this symposium has led , : trus~ 1t is that we--bv~n 
na-ri_ons--the Soviet Union and the T"nl ... ed States 3hould not: f,:A.il 
J.;o :.:elze thi~ opp0::"Gt:.:-::.-ty. 
